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MICROCON research has explored some underlying causes of several types of violence, at national and global levels. Each is the outcome of a complex set of factors, yet in each inequality appears to play an important role. This paper briefly reviews some of the findings, focussing on five types of violence that MICROCON research has investigated -riots in India, 'routine' violence in Indonesia, civil wars, genocide, and global tensions and global terrorism.
The paper then discusses policy findings that follow from the findings. Section 1 provides an overview of the deadliness of different types of violence. Section 2 considers a range of types of violence and some of the underlying causes and preventative mechanisms. Section 3 discusses policy findings. And section 4 concludes.
I.
Types of violence Not all conflict is violent, and not all violence leads to deaths. Broadly, we can categorise types of violence into:
• Domestic violence, involving assaults and sometimes deaths
• Criminal (non-family) attacks on people and property;
• Routine violence (recurring brawls; vigilitantism; mobbing);
• Disturbances/riots (violent protests with a political objective);
• Government violence against civilians, possibly in response to riots
• Civil wars involving the state
• Civil wars not involving the state
• Genocide (which can be difficult to differentiate from civil wars); Table 1 categorises the major types of violence, in terms of magnitude of deaths. We must emphasise that the data are guesstimates more than accurate figures. The classification of events is itself questionable -for example, whether the state is involved or not; whether some deaths should be classified as homicides or battle deaths (for example, in 'drug wars' of Central America). Moreover, the estimates of each kind of death are uncertain. For example, in Indonesia, (Varshney, et al. 2004 ) estimate deaths during the post-Suharto period by careful analysis of national newspapers. But later research using the same method, but also including local newspapers, produced a much large estimate ( (Barron and Sharpe 2008) ranging from a negative estimate of -0.55m to 2.83 million. Similarly, (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005 ) show large variations in estimates of the ratio of battle deaths to total war deathsvarying for example from 4 to 15% in the case of the Biafran war in Nigeria. In estimating deaths due to terrorism, much depends on how 'terrorism' is defined. The estimates of homicides are also uncertain, and the country coverage is incomplete. No 'indirect' deaths are attributed to homicide, but arguably where the rate is high, investment and economic activity generally is likely to be lower, social service provision may be adversely affected as a consequence and hence excess deaths are possible.
Despite these problems, Table 1 is informative. First, we see that direct battle deaths are just a fraction of homicides (6%); however, if we take the upper estimate of the indirect deaths from conflicts, then the total is double that of homicides. Secondly, as interpreted in this data terrorist deaths are high -the upper estimate being two-thirds of the total battle deaths.
Much of this is due to Iraq -where deaths could be defined as 'battle deaths': excluding Iraq, estimates for 2007 vary between 2,573 and 7,523 making them much lower than battle deaths. Even though genocides don't occur on a regular basis, the annualised average for 1951 to 2001 far exceeds the direct deaths from battle of civil war Domestic violence is particularly difficult to quantify as it is often not reported. It has been omitted from Table 1 as a cetgory, though it appears indirectly accounting for many of the female homicides. The proportion of female homicides due to domestic violence is estimated at between 40 and 70%. (Krug GE, et al. 2002) . In terms of number of incidents, domestic violence far exceeds any other kind. On the basis of 48 surveys from different countries the WHO found that between 10% and 69% had been physically assaulted by a partner (WHO 2005) . Riots have also been omitted for lack of data, unless they cause more than 25 deaths and are classified as conflicts. Neither this aspect of violence, nor non-political homicides have formed part of MICROCON research, and they are not considered further in this chapter.
The next section of this chapter reviews some findings on the underlying causes of the other types of violence noted above. First, is a comparison between findings of causes of civil wars and of the underlying preconditions for genocides; secondly, we discuss the causes of riots in India; thirdly, some causes of routine violence in Indonesia are discussed, with a particular focus on the role of decentralisation in abating such violence; finally, we discuss global inequalities and their possible connection with global tensions and terrorism. Each of the findings has strong implications for policy. These are discussed in Section 3 of the paper.
Causes of different types of violence 2a. Genocides and civil wars
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines genocide as 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group'. Genocide is different from civil war: it usually involves deaths on a much larger scale and targets particular groups -mostly civilians -often with the aim of exterminating them.
Typically in genocide -in contrast to civil wars -violence is one-sided; and, fortunately, it is a much rarer phenomenon than civil war. While genocide appears to most people as peculiar, psychopathic and incomprehensible, civil war is more 'normal' involving more mundane pursuit of political and economic objectives. Nonetheless, research has shown that there are socio-economic and political factors that contribute to genocide. Investigation of underlying social, economic and political causes has generally been carried out by different social scientists than those that study civil war (with Gurr as a notable exception). Stewart (2011) compares the findings of the two sets of investigation to see how far they have common causes.
Major differences in definitions of civil war and genocide are:
1. The scale: civil wars can involve quite low rates of death, whereas the deaths in events described as genocide are generally much higher. However, at the upper end, civil wars can involve very high death rates without genocide being a factor (like the Biafran war in Nigeria).
2. The role of the state: the state tends to be the prime agent in genocide; some definitions of civil war also require the state to be a participant, but there are civil conflicts (often described as 'communal') in which the state is not a clear participant (for example, the violence in the middle belt of Nigeria, or in Northern Ghana).
3. The motive: in some genocides (as in the ideological ones as defined by Fein), the prime motive appears to be the elimination of a particular group. Indeed, some (like the UN) define a genocide by the presence of such a motive. In civil wars, no particular motive need be present and a variety of motives are possible. However, closer investigation of genocides suggest a mixture of motives there too (see below).
Despite these differences, there is some blurring of the distinction between the two and many episodes are classified as both civil wars and as genocides. 
Economic factors:
a. Per capita incomes: A general finding from the cross-country econometric literature on civil war is that low per capita income is associated with a higher risk of civil war ( (Collier and Hoeffler 2000) ; (Auvinen and Nafziger 1999; Fearon and Laitin 2003) . The evidence is different and less clear in relation to genocides. For example, (Easterly, et al. 2006) find that the frequency of what they call 'mass killings' is similar across the first three quartiles of countries and drops off only in the fourth quartile.
b. Growth rate: Slow (or negative) growth has also been suggested as likely to
give rise to civil war, partly because it generates a gap between aspirations and reality (which (Gurr 1970 ) has defined as relative deprivation), with some supporting evidence from Auvinen and Nafziger. Similarly, in the genocide literature several authors have also pointed to economic depression as a predisposing factor ( (Midlarsky 2005; Valentino 2000) ). This factor is clearly related to a deficiency in youth employment opportunities referred to above.
c. Natural resources: It has been hypothesised that civil war is more likely in the presence of high value natural resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2000) , supporting the view that 'greed' motivates conflict. But this finding has not been reproduced (Fearon 2005) . The finding that oil resources are associated with civil war is more robust, but here too the conclusion depends on the model specifications and exclusion of outliers (Fearon 2005; (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004) . No such relationship has been found for genocides.
d. Horizontal inequalities: socio-economic horizontal inequalities (inequalities between religious/ethnic/regional groups) have been found to raise the risk of civil war significantly ( (Østby 2008; Stewart 2008) ; (Mancini 2008) ; (Cederman, et al. 2010) ; (Brown 2008) ; (Murshed and Gates 2005 established democracies). In contrast, genocide has been found to be most likely in authoritarian regimes, with genocide more likely the greater the concentration of power. 'The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others, murder its foreign and domestic subjects (Rummel 1995; Rummel 1994) . Most statistical investigations support this finding (Fein 1993; Fein 2000 )Fein 1993 , 2000 Harff 2003 Harff , 2009 Easterly et al 2006) . The conclusions from this review of findings in the two cases are brought together in Table 2 . Similarities between the conditions which give rise to civil war and genocide include:
1. In both cases a past history of civil war/genocide is a predisposing condition. In the case of genocide, civil war itself is almost invariably a precursor of genocide.
2. In neither case are demographic factors -in particular the ethnic composition of the population -strongly associated with incidence; but in both cases, it seems that the midrange of ELF (or having a few large groups) is statistically most dangerous when associated with particular socio-economic conditions, notably inequalities between major groups (horizontal inequalities -HIs). Yet, in the case of genocide it seems that a relatively small group may be the target, or, when in government ,the initiator of the slaughter.
3. In both cases, horizontal inequalities between salient groups -in either economic or political dimensions -raise the risk of conflict, and the risks seem to rise where the two occur simultaneously; the evidence for economic inequalities is more limited for genocides, and more research is needed on this.
Two major differences between civil war and genocide are apparent from this review:
1. While countries with low per capita incomes present high risks for civil war, it is intermediate levels of income that are most strongly associated with genocide.
2. Autocratic/totalitarian regimes are most likely to initiate genocide, while intermediate regimes are most likely to be associated with civil wars.
These are very general findings based on reviewing many investigations of major episodes of violence -genocide and civil war. We now turn to two detailed case studies of different types of violence: the first, on the determinants of riots in Indian states; and the second on whether decentralization reduces routine violence, exploring the case of Indonesia.
2b. Civil unrest in India
Much of the analysis of the causes of conflict (such as that reviewed above) focuses on large scale civil war. Much less attention has been given to local conflicts and social upheavals, although (Barron, et al. 2009 ; Varshney 2002 ) are important exceptions. Yet such conflicts can disrupt economic development and undermine human security. Sometimes they also lead to larger conflagrations.
India has been subject to recurrent episodes of civil unrest, as shown in Figure 1 . These riots were mostly clashes 'between different castes, and between opposite ethnic and religious interests (largely between Hindu and Muslim communities), as a response to disparities in the distribution of employment conditions, access to land and other assets, use of and access to social services and access to institutional power and legal institutions' (Justino 2007: 18) . I.e.
economic, social and political HIs underlay these conflicts. [Riots are defined 'as collective acts of spontaneous violence that include five or more people (Gurr 1970) ].
Yet riots in India did not escalate into civil war, but generally subsided in response to two kinds of government action -an increase in police action or redistributive transfers. Justino presents a model of how these two types of response might affect the level of unrest in a society consisting of two groups, one elite group with privileged access to economic and political resources, and a subordinate group that has limited access economic, social and political opportunities -i.e. groups facing sharp and consistent HIs. In this context, conflict potential is high. Conflict management consists in a combination of the use of policing and/or transfers from the rich to the poor group.
It is assumed that police action represses immediate rioting, but it contributes to further discontent in subsequent periods -the relative impact of the immediate versus the medium term effects of additional police action will determine whether a particular increase in police action contributes to a medium term escalation or reduction in conflict. The extent of horizontal inequality is assumed to affect conflict propensity. However, in her model, Justino assumes that only changes in relative income inequality between the groups affect conflict propensity. A transfer, T, from the rich to the poor group will reduce inequality and the propensity to riot both in the short and in the medium term.
Putting these mechanisms together, her main hypothesis is:
Where C t , C t-1, is conflict at time t and t-1; P t , P t-1 , is policing at t and t-1; 1/θ represents society's inequality aversion; I t-1 is the extent of horizontal inequality at time t-1; and σ, λ represent the elasticity of conflict with respect to a change in policing currently and in the previous period. .
It is assumed that any changes in the income of the poor group is equivalent to the value of the transfers, i.e. I t = ∆Y A -T t Substituting this into (1), are stronger for models taking into account endogeneity.
2. In all models, the current use of police reduces conflict, whereas generally the coefficient for lagged policing is positive. 'The coefficients show that on average across the main 14 states, India needs to hire 20 more policemen in order to have one less riot per year…whereas every additional 25 policemen used in each period will result in one additional riot five years later. ' (Justino, 2007: 30) .
Other factors systematically significantly related to civil unrest are levels of past unrest, poverty headcount, and levels of state income. Higher levels of state income are positively related to conflict unrest which contradicts cross country data which shows the lower the income per capita the higher the conflict propensity. But the cross country investigations do not include poverty as a separate variable.
Although the fundamental assumption of the model is that higher horizontal inequality leads to greater unrest, she does not test this directly, only via the peace-making effects of transfers as measured by social expenditures. The fact that poverty levels are positively associated with unrest and so is state level of per capita income suggests that we would find that vertical inequality (inequality among households) is positively related with unrest, and this may also be an indicator of horizontal inequality.
Putting together her findings on the coefficients of policing and social expenditures suggests that increasing social expenditures is a cheaper mechanism for reducing unrest than increasing policing and has the further advantage of reducing poverty which would also contribute to a reduction in unrest.
2c. Routine violence and decentralisation in Indonesia 'Routine violence' or 'everyday' violence is violence that recurs on a regular basis (Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2008) ). Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2008) The number of routine violent incidents is the dependent variable, and they adopt two econometric approaches appropriate for testing a model where the dependent variable is discrete: a Poisson regression model and a negative binomial model.
The overall increase in fiscal expenditure for all districts in Java was 143% with a standard deviation of 54, pointing to considerable variation in the extent of actual decentralisation. In addition, they consider confounding factors, including growth in incomes of the district, per capita incomes, per capita incomes squared (to allow for an eventual reduction in violence as incomes grow beyond a point) and population size. The results of cross-section analysis (Table   4) is not significant. Using panel data gets almost identical results (Table 5) , although the nonbinomial model now shows somewhat more significant results. Adopting alternative measures of decentralisation again shows a strong negative association between decentralisation, as measured by size of local government or by locally generated revenue, and routine violence. Income per capita ceases to be significant, but income per capita squared is significant (and negatively associated with violence). Population size remains significant.
Two qualifications need to be made before interpreting these findings in a causal way. First, one would expect a decline in violence as the democratic regime matured. The peak in 2000 seems to be associated with the transition to democracy. However, this would not explain the variation across districts at one point in time. Secondly, there may be some sample selection bias, since one reason why some districts achieved more decentralisation, a greater relative size of local government, and of locally generated revenue, may be that they were less violent prone.
To summarise, Murshed and Tadjoeddin find some support for the view that routine violence rises with income but at a declining rate, which may be due to the relative deprivation hypothesis, interpreted as the gap between aspirations and reality; the strong rise and then fall in total routine violence over these years suggests that political transition was one important factor; and finally, it seems that decentralisation is definitely associated with lesser violence, though the direction of causality is not proven.
d. A global perspective
The previous sections have discussed causes of violence within a nation, both at national and local levels. This section moves from the national to the global level. In more detail, the Equality Commission Review notes that the net earnings of Bangladeshi males were reported as just half those of white males (p 25; Interim Report) and deprivation is evident in education at every level of education. For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi rates of attainments in language and literacy at an early age were 57% of those of whites; their achievement of 5-GSEs was three quarters of that of whites for boys and a bit higher for girls; and they were underrepresented in higher education. However, there is evidence of some catch-up in recent years (Sefton and Stewart 2009 ) .Disadvantages are also reported with respect to health (Equality Commission Review: 75).
There is cultural discrimination in each of the countries, with dress being a particular issue. Sulawesi (which also involved ethnic differences). (Table 7) . 
Philippines and Thailand.
There is a strong similarity in the position of Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand relative to the rest of the population. Both form small minorities living in poor regions and facing HIs relative to the rest of the population within their region as well. Muslims in the Philippines account for about 5% of the total population, but a much larger proportion in Mindanao region -around 20% today (a sharp drop over the last 100 years largely due to immigration from the rest of the Philippines, encouraged by the state).
Likewise, in Thailand, the Muslim population forms a small proportion of the total Thai population (4.6%), but a much larger proportion in the Southern region (28% in 2000). (Data   from CIA and Brown, 2008) . In both cases, there has been violent opposition -stronger in the Philippines, more sporadic in Thailand, in which the rebels seek greater political autonomy.
In both countries, the Muslim populations are doubly disadvantaged Brown (2008) : first, the regions in which they are located have lower per capita incomes (and growth rates) than the rest of the country; and secondly within the region of concentration, the Muslim population does less well than the rest of the population.
In the Philippines, Mindanao as a whole has been consistently below the national average in terms of GDP per capita, and particularly below Luzon. Within Mindanao, the socio-economic performance of the five provinces in the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM) is worst of all the Philippines. (Brown, 2008) .
Within Southern Thailand, Muslims are disadvantaged relative to the majority Buddhists. For example, in 1987 (the only year for which there are data of this kind), Buddhist males had 1.68 times the years education of Muslim males; and the discrepancy in household assets was 1.17 (Brown, 2008: 273) . In Thailand, the Southern region where the Muslim population is concentrated also shows worse economic performance than the rest of the country .
Muslim/non-Muslim HIs in West Africa.
In West Africa too, the demographic position of Muslims varies. In some countries Muslims Average per capita incomes of the states where a majority of the population is Muslim are just 44% of those of the non-Muslim countries, and under five mortality rates are almost twice as high (Table 8) , with considerable heterogeneity in each group. The proportion of countries in the high-HD category is much lower for Muslim countries and the proportion in the low-HD category much higher than for non-Muslim (see Figure Six) . There is also a clear imbalance in political power. As indicators of this, Table 6 shows how much greater nonMuslim countries' power is by comparing membership of the Security Council, voting rights at the IMF, and military expenditure. By each measure, the Muslim countries fall well below the non-Muslim, including when calculating these in relation to population shares, or numbers of countries. what they did…it was this idea that it is all one and the same: the struggle in Afghanistan and Iraq and even Britain, that it's all connected.' (Abbas, 2007: 436 on inequality is rarely taken into account, and both national and international expenditures often worsen HIs ( (Brown and Stewart 2006; Langer, et al. 2011) .
Evidence from Malaysia, Northern Ireland and Nepal shows that where a developmental approach that consciously includes the aim of reducing HIs is adopted peace is sustained (or actually created in the case of Northern Ireland). (Faaland, et al. 2003; McCrudden, et al. 2004 ) (Stewart, 2008: 71-76 )(Fukuda-Parr forthcoming 2011)
Policies that are likely to promote inclusive development include support for economic and social infrastructure, and anti-poverty programmes, such as cash transfers. Policies to correct inequalities include progressive taxation and expenditure policies, regional development programmes, effective anti-discrimination laws, human rights legislation, and affirmative action. These need to be combined with continuous monitoring of the distributional impact of the economy and policies. The need for policies directed towards improving the distribution of resources across groups is likely to be a continuous one, since the global economy tends to worsen HIs (Langer et al., 2011) .
The civil war and genocide findings suggest also a need for a special effort to expand employment (also in an inclusive way). To date with rare exceptions (again including Nepal), many programmes acknowledge the need to expand employment, but in reality do very little towards this objective (Stewart 2011 ).
Turning to policies towards the political system, the finding that civil war is more likely during a transition to democracy -which is supported by the many incidents when elections provide the occasion for violence -might be interpreted to suggest that countries should not be encouraged to move towards a democratic system when still at an early stage of development.
Yet the finding that genocide is most likely in autocratic regimes would suggest caution before coming to this conclusion. It would seem that what is needed is to accompany democratic structures with provisions ensuring that power is shared among major groups. A variety of mechanisms can be used to achieve this, some formal, some informal. Murshed and Tadjoeddin suggest decentralisation as one such mechanism. Others are forms of power-sharing at the central level (such as brought about via consociationalist structures), and/or supported by particular voting systems such as proportional representation. What is important is not the precise mechanism adiopted, but that power is effectively shared and seen to be shared. The simple majoritarian democratic system adopted by many countries does not achieve this.
The analysis of global tensions suggests that these policies are needed at the global level as well as within nations. This implies the need for a major effort to improve the relative economic position of Muslim countries generally (and Palestine in particular), and that (following Justino's findings) this is likely to be more effective in the medium term than military interventions. It also implies an effort to reduce the evident political inequalities between Muslim countries and others, incorporating them more systematically into the governance of global institutions.
Conclusions
This chapter has found that socio-economic conditions underly many different forms and scales of violence; in each case, poverty and lack of development and group inequality appear to be at the heart of the problem. A police/military only strategy is not only associated with greater human suffering, but is also likely to be less effective than a strategy directed at the socioeconomic deprivations that underly violence. There are clear implications for policy at many levels, ranging from international redistributive policy, to national and local development policies, as well as for shared political power at each of these levels. At the global level, the implication is that there should be a shift from military intervention to economic support; at the national level, similarly, with a particular focus on inclusive development; and at the local level, less emphasis on policing and more on social expenditure.
